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Abstract 
We examine the long-run GDP impacts of changes in total government expenditure and in 
the shares of different spending categories for a sample of OECD countries since the 1970s, 
taking account of methods of financing expenditure changes and possible endogenous 
relationships. We provide more systematic empirical evidence than available hitherto for 
OECD countries, obtaining strong evidence that reallocating total spending towards 
infrastructure and education is positive for long-run output levels. Reallocating spending 
towards social welfare (and away from all other expenditure categories pro-rata) may be 
associated with modest negative effects on output in the long run. 
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I. Introduction 
The fiscal stimulus packages enacted in many countries from 2009 onwards to combat the 
global economic crisis typically included changes in various public expenditure programs. 
Much debate surrounded the merits of these fiscal packages, not least with respect to the 
wisdom of governments’ attempts, and ability, to stimulate the economy via expenditure 
injections. The specific public spending choices in these short term fiscal packages were 
motivated in part by a desire to be consistent with long term growth objectives, such as 
expanding infrastructure spending perceived as benefiting long-run GDP levels or growth rates. 
The austerity programs that have been used since then to deal with the resulting high levels of 
public debt have led to the same debates but from the opposite side; which types of expenditure 
should be cut and what are the longer term growth effects from doing so. This brings to the fore 
the twin questions: how strong is the evidence that long-run income levels or growth rates 
respond to public expenditure changes, and which expenditure categories have greatest impact? 
This paper focuses on these two questions. We first briefly review the relevant theory. This 
builds on Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) who proposed that some ‘productive’ public 
expenditures can influence long-run growth rates via public sector inputs in private production 
functions. Following a brief discussion of the existing evidence on long-run public expenditure-
output relationships, we provide more systematic empirical evidence than available hitherto for 
OECD countries.1 
In addition to the above political economy motivations, there are a number of academic 
reasons to re-examine this issue. Firstly, most empirical studies focus on a subset of individual 
expenditure categories, such as defence, education or transport and communication 
expenditures. These have produced a mixed set of findings and do not typically allow the trade-
offs between different forms of public expenditure to be identified explicitly. Our approach 
provides evidence on these trade-offs. 
Secondly, a number of recent papers have used alternative methodologies to examine long-
run impacts of tax policy on GDP levels or growth rates (see Adam and Bevan, 2005; Lee and 
Gordon, 2005; Romero-Avila and Strauch, 2008; Arnold et al, 2011; Gemmell et al., 2011, 
2015). However, public expenditure is rarely the primary focus of attention in these studies, or 
it is tested as an aggregate ‘productive’ spending category. In this paper we limit attention to 
potential effects of public expenditures on long-run GDP levels, focusing both on total public 
expenditure (suitably financed via the government budget constraint) and specific functional 
spending categories. 
                                                          
1
 We abstract from the question of whether there are short-run benefits from stimulus packages, analysis of which 
requires quite different empirical methodologies. 
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Thirdly, dealing with endogeneity associated with estimates of fiscal impacts on GDP has 
proved difficult in previous studies. While we do not claim to have resolved these concerns in 
this paper, we do carefully address potential endogeneity problems. Our fiscal variables would 
appear to be at least ‘weakly exogenous’ (based on standard econometric definitions, see 
Johansen, 1992, and Boswijk, 1995) with respect to their estimated effects on GDP. 
Fourthly, use of panel data methods has increased the reliability of recent studies. 
However, these generally use fixed effects estimators which impose parameter homogeneity 
across countries. Furthermore, as Haque’s (2004) re-examination of the Devarajan et al (1996) 
results shows, how the time-series properties of the data are handled can be crucial for 
estimated output effects of fiscal variables. 
In this paper, access to an extended panel dataset with a longer time dimension than 
previous studies has permitted application of the more flexible Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999). This enables us to explore both short run dynamics 
and long-run equilibrium relationships among the variables of interest, and account for 
heterogeneity across countries in their short run dynamic relationships. We compare these 
results with those obtained using more restrictive dynamic fixed effects (DFE) methods, and 
the more flexible, but data-intensive, Mean Group (MG) approach. 
These improvements provide more robust evidence on the potential long-run association 
and causation between public spending and GDP. This supports some traditional views, such as 
that a spending reallocation towards infrastructure and education spending (and to a lesser 
extent, health) can raise GDP over the long run. Our results also suggest that, relative to public 
spending ‘on average’, social welfare spending may have moderate GDP-reducing effects. This 
implies a possible trade-off between public spending aimed at income redistribution via social 
welfare spending, and spending aimed at raising overall income levels. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly describes the links 
between public expenditure composition and GDP growth hypothesised by recent theory, and 
summarises current evidence for OECD countries. Section III then discusses our testing 
methodologies and dataset; while section IV reports results for a sample of 17 OECD countries 
over 1972-2008. Some conclusions are drawn in section V. 
II. Public spending, taxes and growth 
Theory 
As is well known, in the neoclassical growth model, if the incentives to save or to invest in new 
capital are affected by fiscal policy, this alters the equilibrium capital-output ratio, and 
therefore the level of the output path but not its slope. There are effects on growth rates only for 
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a transitional period as the economy moves onto its new output path, though the length of this 
transition remains subject to debate.2 There is, however, a resulting permanent impact on the 
long-run level of output (GDP). The 1990s saw the development of a number of growth models 
with a permanent, or at least persistent, role for fiscal policy such as those of Barro (1990), 
Futagami et al. (1993) and Deverajan et al. (1996). 
A novel feature of these models was that fiscal policy can determine both the level of the 
output path and the steady-state (long-run) growth rate.3 Key fiscal aspects include some 
‘productive’ public expenditures affecting private sector productivity while other 
‘unproductive’ expenditures only impact on citizens’ welfare (including the possibility of zero 
welfare effects), and that some taxes levied to fund public expenditures distort investment 
decisions. In a model with multiple productive expenditures Devarajan et al. (1996) show that 
the long-run growth effects depend upon a combination of the relative productivities of these 
expenditures and their relative budget shares. 
A number of recent papers have modelled the relationship between particular public 
spending categories and growth. For example, Blankenau and Simpson (2004), Agénor and 
Neanidis (2006), Semmler et al. (2007), Agénor (2008) and Agénor (2012) have examined 
various extensions of the Barro/Devarajan framework which explicitly model infrastructure, 
education and/or health spending as inputs into private production; and interactions between 
these spending types. For example, health services or infrastructure spending may enter the 
production function for education.4 
These models propose mechanisms by which permanent impacts on GDP growth rates can 
arise in association with changes in particular public expenditure categories, especially those 
related to infrastructure and human capital production. However, permanent growth effects in 
these endogenous growth models generally depend on so-called ‘knife-edge’ properties 
whereby reproducible factors of production must display exactly constant returns to scale 
(Solow, 1994; Dalgaard and Kreiner, 2003). While the conditions for such permanent effects 
may be restrictive, and hard to verify empirically, even in their absence, the mechanisms 
embedded in endogenous growth models suggest that public spending could have effects on 
growth that are highly persistent. 
Existing empirical evidence on public expenditure and growth 
                                                          
2
 Turnovsky (2004), for example, estimates ‘transitional’ output adjustments to fiscal policy changes in terms of 
decades, while Lee et al. (1997) find convergence to equilibrium with half-lives of a few years, rather than 
decades. 
3
 Not all endogenous growth models predict long-run growth effects from fiscal policy, such as the ‘non-scale’ 
growth model of Eicher and Turnovsky (1999). 
4
 See Albertini et al. (2014) for an examination of short-run fiscal multipliers for different components of 
government spending at the zero lower bound, based on a New Keynesian model. 
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Much of the empirical literature testing for fiscal policy impacts on long-run GDP levels or 
growth rates suffers from various methodological weaknesses.5 In particular it is now 
recognised that tests of the output effects of public expenditure decompositions (and other 
fiscal variables) must accommodate the total government budget (expenditures, revenues, 
deficits); a feature missing from much of the earlier literature. Nevertheless, for specific 
spending decompositions, some early studies found education, health and/or transport & 
communication (T&C) spending to be positively associated with GDP growth; see Nijkamp 
and Poot (2004) for a meta-analysis of early studies. 
As shown by Kneller et al. (1999), without accounting for the government budget 
constraint (GBC), evidence on the long-run output effects of public expenditures is difficult to 
interpret and can appear to be non-robust. Recent studies, such as Acosta-Ormaechea and 
Morozumi (2013) and Afonso and Jalles (2014), have sought to accommodate the GBC, to 
varying degrees, in their empirical approaches. Both studies focus on social security, education 
and health spending (and T&C in the case of Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi), generally 
finding negative associations between GDP growth and social security spending but positive 
associations for education and health. These results are obtained for large samples of 
developing and developed countries, rely on period averaging of annual data (hence ignoring 
short-run dynamics), and impose parameter homogeneity across countries. 
As noted above, we prefer to focus on a more homogeneous group of OECD countries, 
using annual data and panel techniques that can identify both short and long-run effects whilst 
allowing for heterogeneity across countries in responses to fiscal shocks. Like Acosta-
Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), and Arnold et al.’s (2011) analysis of tax decompositions, 
we examine relationships between fiscal variables and long-run GDP levels rather than growth 
rates. An advantage of this ‘levels specification’, discussed further below, is that it allows the 
data to identify the degree of persistence in GDP growth responses, rather than impose a 
functional form embodying permanent effects. 
III. Methodology and data 
Growth versus level effects 
The empirical specification adopted by much of the empirical literature testing for public 
expenditure-GDP growth effects since Devarajan et al. (1996) is based on their endogenous 
growth model. This model, derived from the Barro (1990) framework, essentially generates an 
estimating equation in which the growth rate of GDP in country i at time t is a function of the 
ratio of total government expenditure, E, to GDP and a vector of shares of j individual 
                                                          
5
 See Slemrod (1995), Tanzi and Zee (1997), Myles (2000) for earlier, more detailed reviews and Temple (1999) 
for a more wide-ranging review of growth empirics. 
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categories within total government expenditure, ej. Sets of conditioning variables, consistent 
with a more general growth model or more pragmatic considerations, are often included; see 
Devarajan et al. (1996; p.322). In a panel context, the Devarajan et al. endogenous growth 
model takes the form: 
( ) ( )
 variablescontrol  ... // 
,,,1,, +++++=∆= ∑ tititik
k
ktititi EEYEyg εωµββ  (1) 
where yit is the log of GDP per capita in country i at time t, git is the growth rate (log difference: 
ity∆ ), Y is GDP, E is total public expenditure and Ek is the kth expenditure component, µi and ωt 
are country and time fixed effects, and εit is a classical error term.6 
A difficulty with equation (1) is that it is specific to the endogenous growth model with 
permanent growth effects from fiscal policy changes, and no transitional dynamics. To allow 
for Solow-type transitional dynamics, but where the effects of fiscal policy may be persistent, 
requires a more flexible functional form. This is particularly important when working with 
annual data. We follow Arnold et al. (2007, 2011) and use an autoregressive distributed lag, 
ARDL(p, q), model, parameterised in error correction form.7 This allows both the short run 
dynamic, and the long-run equilibrium, relationships between GDP and fiscal variables to be 
separately identified. 
Consider the following general ARDL(p, q) specification: 
, = ∑ ,,	


 + ∑ ,,	 +  +

 , (2.1) 
∆, = ζ∆,	 + ζ∆,	 + …+ ζ∆,	 + , (2.2) 
where the vector Xi,t in (2.1) includes both the fiscal variables of interest (e.g. the level and mix 
of expenditures, E/Y and Ek/E respectively), and control variables. The α, β, and ζ are 
parameters to be estimated; where the ζs capture the autoregressive process in ∆Xi,t. 
A number of parameterisations of (2.1) are possible (see Wickens and Breusch, 1988), but 
it is convenient to express (2.1) in error correction (ECM) form: 
, = ∆, = φ,	 − , + ∑ ,
∗ ∆,	

	
 + ∑ ,
∗ ∆,	 +  +
	
 , (3) 
where φ = −(1 − ∑ ,)


  captures the error correcting component, and  = (∑ ,/φ)

  
captures the long-run equilibrium relationships between y and X, with short run effects 
measured by ,∗  – the parameters associated with the ∆X variables in (3). The error correction 
term, φi, is a measure of the speed at which the model returns to equilibrium after a shock. 
Equation (3) allows φi, and βi, to vary across countries, though alternative econometric 
                                                          
6
 The dependent variable in some cases is per capita GDP growth, which simply involves a re-parameterisation 
when GDP is on the left-hand side and the vector of control variables includes a measure of population growth on 
the right-hand side. 
7Arnold et al. (2007) show that such a specification can be consistent with, and nest, alternative augmented Solow 
and (Uzawa-Lucas) endogenous growth models. 
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approaches (PMG, MG, DFE etc.) involve differing homogeneity restrictions, as discussed 
further below. 
The degree of persistence of any fiscal effects on output growth in the model is, of course, 
determined by the model’s convergence properties.8 Although the dependent variable in (3) is 
per capita GDP growth, the regression measures the impacts of fiscal and other variables on the 
long-run per capita GDP level, since (3) is merely a re-parameterisation of (2.1). 
The government budget constraint 
Since the GBC describes a ‘closed system’, whatever parametrisation is adopted the 
estimating equation needs to recognise that expenditures, Ei,t, must be financed by revenues, 
Ri,t, and/or the budget surplus/deficit, Di,t, each with potential output effects, since ititit ERD −=  
(see Kneller et al., 1999; Gemmell et al., 2011). As a result, in addition to the variables E/Y and 
∆(E/Y) within the vectors X and ∆X in (3), (R/Y) and (D/Y) also potentially have effects on 
output with any net output effect depending on the particular financing combinations assumed. 
Hence a decomposition of βiXi,t in equation (3) includes (setting βi = β for convenience): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .... / /// ... 1,k4,1,31,21,1 ∑ −−−− +++
k
tiktititi EEYDYRYE ββββ  (4) 
and similarly for the short run output effects of expenditures, revenues and deficits. However, 
since introducing all three variables would be perfectly collinear in a regression, one must be 
chosen to omit. Omitting (D/Y)i,t-1, (4) becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) .... / /)(  /)(  ... 1k4,1,321,31 ∑ −−− +−+−
k
itktiti EEYRYE βββββ  (5) 
This demonstrates the correct interpretation of the output effects of expenditure and 
revenue variables, within this model. Estimates of the fiscal parameters in (5) capture the 
effects of increases in total expenditure, or decreases in revenues, financed by changes in the 
budget deficit (the omitted category in this example). These effects can be seen to depend on 
the signs and relative sizes of β1, β2 and β3. In comparison, the interpretation of the coefficients 
on the individual expenditure share components of interest, β4,k, remains unaffected. 
In the applications below, each regression includes one of the k = 1…K expenditure share 
elements, Ek/E, where the included kth expenditure category is rotated across the K different 
categories. Including each expenditure share in turn, rather than all K-1 expenditure shares 
simultaneously, saves on degrees of freedom in our panel regression model which requires a 
large number of parameters to be estimated; see below.9 
                                                          
8
 Though the parameter φ can be interpreted as a speed of adjustment, it is not equal to the more familiar rate of 
conditional convergence in this model. This is because the short-run dynamics are more complicated than in a 
conditional convergence regression. 
9
 By repeating regressions on equation (3) but including a different expenditure category each time (from (5)), the 
per capita GDP impacts of a bilateral switch between any two expenditure categories, l and m, can be obtained. 
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Allowing for heterogeneous fiscal-output effects 
We estimate an equation of the form in (3) above using the pooled mean group (PMG) 
methodology of Pesaran et al. (1999), and compare this with the equivalent results using fixed 
effects (FE), and mean group (MG), estimators. The PMG estimator provides a useful 
intermediate alternative between estimating separate country regressions (the MG case) and the 
fixed effects estimator which imposes homogeneity on all slope coefficients and error variances 
across countries. The PMG estimator allows the intercepts, short run coefficients and error 
variances to differ freely across groups, but constrains the long-run coefficients to be the same. 
If homogeneity of the long-run responses is not rejected, the PMG is the preferred 
estimator because of its efficiency relative to the MG estimator which permits long-run 
heterogeneity. Pesaran et al. (1999) demonstrate that the PMG’s allowance for short run 
parameter heterogeneity yields more reliable estimates of the long-run responses, and can affect 
estimated speeds of convergence towards long-run equilibrium. 
A disadvantage of the PMG estimator is that, unless the available time series are long, a 
degrees of freedom problem is soon reached. For the dataset available here this requires some 
restrictions on lag lengths and/or the set of right-hand-side (RHS) variables. For this reason we 
restrict the RHS variables to include each expenditure share separately in turn, with up to two 
lags. Though this lag length is relatively short, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
ensures the specification can accommodate a high degree of persistence in the short run 
adjustment process following a shock. 
We also include two non-fiscal control variables – the private non-residential investment 
rate and employment growth. These variables appear in many empirical growth models 
capturing the role of private sector inputs. Also, recognising that some public expenditures may 
impact on GDP partially through their impact on private investment, we omit the latter variable 
from some specifications. 
An important aspect of equation (3) when testing for the output effects of public 
expenditures is that it allows the degree of persistence of these effects to differ across 
expenditure types, at least to the extent that these can be captured by the 30+ years of our data. 
In addition, we test the PMG assumption of long-run parameter homogeneity against the mean 
group (MG) and fixed effects (FE) alternatives, using a Hausman test. 
Addressing endogeneity 
A major concern when running regressions of the form in (3) is, of course, the potential for 
simultaneity between GDP per capita and the right-hand-side variables − especially the fiscal 
and investment variables, a point stressed by Slemrod (1995) in a cross-section growth 
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regression context. In addition, country-specific, time-varying factors such as changes to 
political and institutional settings may influence both fiscal policy and GDP per capita.10 These 
may be compounded by persistence in the annual fiscal series and potentially long lags in the 
impacts of fiscal variables on GDP per capita, generating serial correlation in the error process 
that must be dealt with adequately. As a result the fiscal variables of interest here may be 
endogenous, with well-known problems of interpretation for the short and long-run OLS 
parameters. 
In a series of papers in the mid-1990s, Pesaran and associates (see, for example, Pesaran 
and Smith, 1995; Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran and Shin, 1999) demonstrated that, under a number of 
conditions such as a unique cointegrating relationship, estimates of the long-run parameter 
vector, β, obtained from OLS regressions of models such as (3) are consistent.11 Further, based 
on simulation results, Pesaran et al. (1999) demonstrate that even in small samples standard t- 
and F-tests on the long-run parameters from the ECMs are valid, given suitable specification of 
the lag structures of dependent and independent variables.12 
Further, where serial correlation is a concern, ‘appropriate modification of the orders of the 
ARDL model’ (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.386) is sufficient to deal with both the serial 
correlation in the error process and/or regressor endogeneity (see also Kanas and Kouretas, 
2005). We discuss these aspects further in section IV when we present our empirical results. 
The updated dataset 
Results reported below are based on an extension of the Bleaney et al. (2001) dataset, which 
uses the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics (GFS) fiscal data for 17 OECD countries to 
construct measures of total expenditure and individual expenditure shares, distortionary and 
non-distortionary taxes, and budget surpluses/deficits.13 The original data, available from the 
early 1970s to 1995, have been updated to 2007 or 2008, providing around 30-35 annual time-
series observations each for most of the 17 countries.14 We exclude data after 2008 to avoid 
long-run estimates being unduly affected by the large shock (associated with the global 
financial crisis and its aftermath) to fiscal, GDP and other variables after 2008. 
Data on GDP, the private investment/GDP ratio and employment growth were obtained for 
the same period from OECD sources. An important difference from previous studies is that our 
investment variable is private non-residential investment (PNRI) instead of total investment 
                                                          
10
 We do however deal with time-specific shocks common to all countries in the sample. 
11
 Indeed, where variables are I(1), they argue that parameter estimates are super-consistent. 
12
 See, for example, Pesaran (1997, pp. 182-185), Pesaran and Shin (1999, pp. 381-387; 404-405). 
13
 The 17 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK and US. Other OECD countries 
are excluded due to missing values for several years; see online appendix. 
14
 This is not straightforward, however, because of changes in the GFS methodology, which moved from a cash 
accounting, to an accruals accounting, basis for fiscal data from the late 1990s onwards; see online appendix. 
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(gross fixed capital formation). Since all regressions include various public expenditure 
variables, the use of PNRI avoids the possibility of double counting much public investment 
which otherwise would contribute to both the investment and public expenditure data. Before 
running all regressions we de-mean all data series as recommended by Lee et al. (1997) and 
Pesaran et al. (1999) to deal with potential cross-sectional error correlation. Measuring all 
variables as deviations from their sample means in each year removes the effects of common 
shocks in the data. 
IV. Empirical results 
Pre-testing for lag lengths 
As discussed in section III, following Pesaran and Shin (1999), regressions on equation (3) 
require knowledge of the appropriate lag structures if the Xi,t in (3) are to be interpreted as 
exogenous or weakly exogenous; see below. Before running our PMG regressions, our 
procedure therefore follows the pre-test proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) to select the 
preferred lag structure for the dependent, and each independent, variable based on the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC; see Pesaran and Shin, 1999). This uses up to two lags for each 
variable and country; in practice we find that two lags are required relatively rarely.15 The 
results of PMG regressions on equation (3) reported below are those for the SIC-based lag 
structures. 
Testing for total public expenditure effects 
Before examining the GDP effects associated with the shares of particular expenditure 
categories it is worth noting the impact of the omitted financing category in the government 
budget constraint because it affects the interpretation of the included parameters. As the 
parameter estimates on the shares of individual spending categories in total expenditure are 
unaffected by this we omit them from the regressions for the moment. 
Table 1 shows the long-run and short run parameters for six PMG regressions in which 
total spending is included, financed by combinations of three alternative fiscal variables (non-
distortionary taxes, deficits and distortionary taxes) in columns 1-4. Column 5 repeats the 
regression in column 2, but with the private investment control variable omitted.16 Results for 
alternative (MG and DFE) estimators are then reported in Table 2. The role of different implicit 
                                                          
15
 For example, in each of regressions 1–3 of Table 1, there are a maximum of 204 possible parameters (17 
countries x 6 included variables x 2 lags). Regression 4 involves 5 variables, hence 170 possible parameters. For 
those four regressions, two lags were selected in only 11%, 8%, 9% and 4% respectively of the possible cases. 
16
 In general the ‘non-distortionary’ taxes in this context are consumption taxes. The term ‘less growth 
distortionary’ may be more appropriate in this case since these taxes can distort investment decisions in models 
where labour supply effects are allowed for. The method of aggregating the GFS functional classification into 
these sub-aggregates is described in Bleaney et al. (2001). ‘Other revenues’ refers to the GFS categories ‘taxes on 
international trade and transactions’, ‘other taxes’ and ‘non tax revenues’. It is unclear how distortionary these 
might be. Other revenues (non-tax revenues) are approximately 13% (9%) of total revenues in our sample. 
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financing of fiscal variables has been discussed by Gemmell et al. (2011) so is only briefly 
reviewed here. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Regression 1 in Table 1 reveals that increasing total public spending, financed by the 
(omitted) non-distortionary taxes has a long-run output effect that is positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero. However, the same spending increase can alternatively be 
financed by either a reduced budget surplus (regression 2), or by an increase in distortionary 
taxes and/or increases in any/all taxes (regressions 3 and 4), or by some combination. 
Regressions 2-4 in Table 1 show that each of those cases produces a negative, statistically 
significant long-run parameter on the public expenditure variable. The different regression 
specifications in Table 1 confirm that the assumed (or imposed) method of financing a public 
expenditure increase is crucial for estimates of their likely impact on long-run levels of GDP 
per capita. 
The Table 1 results suggests that, within our dataset, use of ‘non-distortionary’ forms of 
taxation (such as VAT) to fund a given unit of additional public spending has been associated, 
ceteris paribus, with increases in GDP per capita levels in the long run, whereas other forms of 
financing such spending have been associated with decreases in GDP per capita.17 Table 1 
results for total public expenditure parameters also tend to suggest that the adverse long-run 
effects on GDP per capita from distortionary tax financing (at –0.024) are significantly greater 
than those associated with other forms of financing (around –0.012).18 However this should be 
interpreted cautiously. As we show below, specifications that also allow for different effects on 
GDP per capita from differences in specific public expenditure shares (Table 3) suggest that the 
magnitude of the total expenditure parameter can be somewhat sensitive to the included 
expenditure share variables. 
Recognising that some fiscal-GDP effects could be mediated through private investment 
(as distinct from via factor productivity), regression 5 in Table 1 examines whether omitting 
investment from the control variables affects conclusions regarding the GDP impacts of public 
expenditures. Comparing the equivalent, budget deficit-financed cases in regressions 2 and 5, 
the estimates suggest that parameters on fiscal variables, including total public expenditure, are 
                                                          
17
 The control variables in these regressions generally perform as expected: larger investment ratios and 
employment growth (proxying labour force growth) are associated with higher GDP per capita, though the former 
is not statistically robust, sometimes taking a negative sign.  The error correction parameter, at around –0.03 to –
0.09, implies a fairly high degree of persistence. 
18
 Testing differences in the parameters on total expenditure in regressions 2 and 3 in Table 1 confirms that the 
parameter on total expenditure financed by distortionary taxes has a statistically (at 5%) greater negative impact on 
growth than when financed by a budget deficit. The same test for regressions 3 and 4 yields the same conclusion: 
the negative growth impact of public spending financed by distortionary taxes is significantly more negative than 
when financed by non-distortionary taxes. 
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little affected by the omission. That is, estimated public expenditure effects on per capita GDP 
are largely orthogonal to private investment effects on per capita GDP.19 
Overall, while the results in Table 1 yield similar estimates of fiscal variable impacts on 
GDP (when the appropriate interpretation is recognised as discussed above), our preferred 
specification is regression 2 which omits the budget surplus. This facilitates interpretation 
because deficit-funded tax or expenditure changes have an intuitive economic interpretation 
and because across all countries a one unit change in a budget surplus/deficit is a more uniform 
metric. This is less true for a one unit change in distortionary or non-distortionary tax because 
the composition of these tax variables (income tax, VAT etc.) can differ across countries, and 
each component tax may differ in its effects on GDP. We therefore base our further testing of 
public expenditure effects using the specification that omits the budget surplus. 
As noted above, the PMG estimator provides a greater degree of flexibility, compared to 
dynamic fixed effects models, in estimating long-run parameters by allowing short run 
parameters to differ across countries. The Mean Group estimator allows for further flexibility 
via heterogeneous long-run effects across countries but at a further cost in terms of degrees of 
freedom. We test for possible sensitivity of our Table 1 results to the PMG specification, based 
on regression 2 in Table 1. Table 2 presents equivalent results for dynamic fixed effects and 
mean group models (and repeats PMG results for comparison). Non-fiscal variables are 
included in regressions but omitted from the table to save space. 
In Table 2, the parameters on each fiscal variable take the same sign but with standard 
errors generally larger using the MG or DFE estimators. As a result, parameter estimates for 
those cases are generally not statistically significant at conventional levels. That this is the case 
for the MG estimates is no surprise, given the large number of parameters to be estimated. 
However the comparison between PMG and DFE suggests that allowing for heterogeneous 
short run parameters across countries enables more precise long-run parameter estimates to be 
obtained. This mirrors results obtained by Gemmell et al. (2011, pp. F43-44) who also find that 
the DFE, unlike the PMG, requires a lag structure of up to eight lags to identify long-run 
parameters. 
The far right-hand column of Table 2 reports results from Hausman tests of the PMG 
restrictions against those associated with the less restrictive MG estimators for each fiscal 
variable and for the regression specification as a whole. The final row compares the PMG 
                                                          
19
 This is perhaps not surprising, given the limited contribution to long-run output apparently due to private 
investment in Table 1. To investigate this issue further we ran similar regressions with original, rather than de-
meaned, data. This yielded a larger, statistically significant investment parameter. This may reflect a high degree 
of co-movement in private investment across countries such that, after de-meaning the data, there is little country-
specific variation in the investment data, or that any such variation has only a modest influence on long-run per 
capita GDP levels (though it may still have a strong effect on short-run growth rates). 
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regression with the DFE equivalent. The Hausman tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-
systematic differences in parameters between the PMG and MG estimators, supporting the 
PMG restriction of homogeneous long-run effects across countries. This also holds for the 
regression as a whole (χ2(5) = 7.20; p-value = 0.21). By contrast, the Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis that differences between the PMG and DFE are not systematic (χ2(5) = 16.51; 
p-value = 0.00), rejecting the additional short run restrictions of the DFE model. 
Finally, though results in Table 2 appear to support long-run parameter homogeneity, in an 
online appendix (Table A1) we report MG parameter estimates for total public expenditure by 
country, as well as cross-country means and medians. From Table 2, the mean long-run MG 
parameter for total public spending is −0.020 (t = 1.65). The online appendix shows that, when 
long-run parameters are allowed to differ, three countries, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand, 
take relatively large (absolute) parameter values for total expenditure (−0.20, 0.07, −0.06 
respectively). However, for 13 of the 17 countries parameter estimates are negative and 
generally close to the arithmetic mean of the long-run estimates, −0.020. 
Public Expenditure Composition and GDP 
To explore the potential long-run effects of public spending composition on GDP, we again 
focus on the specification in which changes in total spending are implicitly funded by a change 
in the budget deficit. Table 3 shows the results from repeating this PMG regression, but adding 
the shares of each public spending category − transport & communications (T&C), education, 
health, etc. − in total expenditure (excluding interest payments). To save space the table shows 
only the parameters on total public expenditure and the spending decompositions of interest. 
Due to a lack of degrees of freedom, it is not possible to include all (n-1) categories in one 
regression though, as noted earlier, it would be possible to construct the growth trade-off 
associated with any bilateral expenditure share switch. The parameter on each expenditure 
share in regressions (1)–(9) should therefore be interpreted as the impact on long-run per capita 
GDP levels of switching spending into the included expenditure category (say, T&C) and away 
from remaining expenditure categories on a pro rata basis, holding total spending constant as a 
ratio of GDP. A significant positive (negative) parameter indicates that the category in question 
has a greater (smaller) impact on long-run GDP than the remaining expenditure categories. 
All regressions (except for T&C) reveal net negative total spending growth effects when 
funded from increased budget deficits (consistent with Table 1 results for this case). Whilst 
possible positive short term GDP impacts of fiscal stimulus packages have figured prominently 
in recent macroeconomic debates, these results suggest a possible adverse impact on longer 
term per capita GDP levels if higher deficit-financed expenditure levels persist. 
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Switching into some spending categories might be expected to have limited effects on 
GDP either where there are negligible short run impacts from the relevant public expenditures 
or where the ‘favoured’ category has similar (possibly substantial) GDP impacts to those 
categories where spending shares decrease. For example, as in Barro (1990), if public spending 
levels and shares have each been set in a growth-maximising manner there should be no 
evidence of output benefits or costs from reallocating expenditures at the margin. However, 
clearly some public spending in OECD countries is allocated to meet non-growth objectives 
such as social welfare provision or redistribution. A lack of knowledge of the growth effects of 
different spending types may also inhibit growth-maximising policy choices. 
[Table 3 about here] 
In Table 3 we find that most of the expenditure shares exhibit small positive or negative 
long-run GDP effects that are not statistically different from zero. However, some changes in 
the mix of public expenditures are found to have significant effects on GDP over the long-run. 
In interpreting regression parameter estimates it is important to remember that these represent 
the combined impact of one additional unit of a particular type of spending (say, education), 
financed by reductions in the other spending categories. 
Table 3 provides evidence of potential positive GDP effects from changes in T&C, 
education and (less reliably identified) housing spending shares. The parameter for health 
spending is positive but small and with a relatively large standard error. Negative long-run 
associations with GDP are observed for spending shares for social welfare, defence, economic 
services, general public services and recreational services, but only for general public services 
is the estimate statistically significant at 10% or less.20 
The parameters in Table 3 can be interpreted as follows: a permanent 1 percentage point 
increase in the T&C share in total spending is associated, on average, with a long-run level of 
GDP per capita that is 2.2% higher than the counterfactual of an unchanged T&C spending 
share.21 For example, if GDP grows at 2% per year with an unchanged T&C share, GDP would 
rise from 100 to 148.6 after 20 years. In comparison a 1 percentage point T&C share increase 
would instead raise GDP to around 150.8 after 20 years. This seems a plausible order of 
magnitude arising from a persistent non-marginal reallocation (about one-third of the sample 
standard deviation) towards a directly growth-enhancing spending category, and away from all 
                                                          
20
 We have also examined whether the PMG results in Table 3 are preferred to either a MG or DFE approach. 
Results reported in the online appendix again confirm that the PMG estimates are preferred, on a Hausman test, to 
either the MG or the DFE estimates. Both these other approaches yield noisy parameters for public expenditure 
variables. 
21Recall that our results relate to a change relative to the average of the OECD sample; hence we assume here that 
only one country experiences the simulated T&C spending share increase. 
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other spending categories pro rata. We estimate these other spending types to have smaller 
positive, or even negative, impacts on GDP. 
These results align with a number of findings within the current literature. For example, 
Nijkamp and Poot’s (2004) meta-analysis of fiscal policy and growth supports positive impacts 
of infrastructure and public education on GDP. They conclude (p.91): ‘On balance, the 
evidence for a positive effect of conventional fiscal policy on growth is rather weak, but the 
commonly identified importance of education and infrastructure is confirmed’. Our results are 
also broadly consistent with those obtained by Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) and 
Alfonso and Jalles (2014) for education, health and social security spending, despite quite 
different samples and approaches to estimation. 
Dealing with endogeneity concerns 
A commonly cited reason for skepticism regarding the validity or interpretation of aggregate 
growth regressions is the possibility that estimated relationships represent correlations but not 
causation.22 We cannot discount the possibility that our evidence so far arises from 
simultaneous relationships between GDP and fiscal variables. As well as direct impacts of 
fiscal variables on GDP, changes in GDP may induce changes in these fiscal variables. Fiscal 
policy changes may also be associated with country-specific time-varying variables, such as 
political conditions, that influence GDP levels or growth rates. 
Such arguments with respect to total government expenditure or taxation are well known. 
Economic downturns reduce taxable capacity and l ad to increases in certain types of public 
expenditure such as unemployment benefits and social insurance payments. Though these may 
be at the expense of other types of expenditure, this is often insufficient to prevent total 
spending from rising in downturns. Short run contractions of less cyclically-dependent 
expenditures, such as public investment, are typically more difficult to achieve when social 
expenditures increase; see Sanz and Velázquez (2004) and Sanz (2010). 
The effect on expenditure components is less clear. As already noted, social welfare 
expenditures might be expected to rise in response to an economic downturn yielding negative 
correlations with GDP. On the other hand, more ‘productive’ expenditure shares may rise when 
faster GDP growth generates additional revenues, and demands for social welfare-related 
expenditures weaken. This would have contrasting effects on the shares of these different 
components of expenditure in total expenditure and for total expenditure as a ratio to GDP. In 
addition, over the longer term, the income elasticity of demand for education and health may be 
high, leading to upward pressure on public spending (Slemrod, 1995). 
                                                          
22
 See Slemrod (1995) for robust criticisms along these lines regarding cross-country empirical evidence. 
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Pesaran and Shin (1999) contend that, in the context of ARDL models, the problem of 
endogenous regressors can readily be handled by the PMG estimator where the regressors are 
I(1), subject to some restrictions (such as a unique cointegrating relationship among the 
variables, but where regressors are not cointegrated among themselves). In this case, Pesaran et 
al. (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that potential endogeneity can be dealt with by 
appropriate augmentation of the lag structure of the ARDL(p, q) model − to an ARDL(p, m) 
model, where m ≥ q. Endogeneity of I(1) regressors can be accommodated by a projection of 
the errors on the regressors. An ARDL with sufficiently long lags overcomes the endogeneity 
problem provided the regressors are not cointegrated among themselves, and where interest 
focuses on the long-run parameters (see Pesaran and Shin, 1999, pp. 372-3; 384-5).23 
To explore these endogeneity issues we first check whether our variables are I(0) or I(1) 
and whether they are cointegrated. We then consider the appropriate ARDL(p, m) lag structure. 
Testing the order of integration and cointegration 
We begin by testing whether our variables are I(0) or I(1), using the panel unit root tests of 
Harris-Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000) and Pesaran (2007). Results are reported in online 
appendix Table A3. The Harris-Tzavalis (1999) test assumes that all panels have the same 
autoregressive parameter and that the number of time periods is fixed. The Breitung (2000) test 
also assumes that all panels have a common autoregressive parameter, but Breitung shows that 
the test has power in the heterogeneous case, where each can take its own autoregressive 
parameter.24 The Harris-Tzavalis test rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity only for the 
budget surplus and employment growth. The Breitung test rejects the null for these two 
variables along with the housing and economic services spending shares. In the regression 
specifications that are the main focus of our analysis, the budget surplus is omitted. 
The second generation panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007) – the cross-sectionally 
augmented Im, Pesaran and Shin (CIPS) test – allows for heterogeneity in the autoregressive 
coefficient of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression with lagged cross-sectional mean and 
its first difference capturing the cross-sectional dependence. Pesaran (2007) shows that the 
CIPS test has satisfactory size and power even for relatively small samples. According to this 
test, all of our variables are I(1) except employment growth and the defence spending share. 
Overall, from these three tests it seems that our variables are best treated as non-stationary 
except for the budget surplus and employment growth. After taking first differences, however, 
                                                          
23
 As Pesaran (1997) emphasises, for the order-augmented ARDL(p, m) model to deal with endogeneity as 
described above, it is also required that the long-run relationship is unique. Where there is more than one 
cointegrating relationship, an identification problem must first be resolved; see Pesaran (1997, section II.2). 
24
 Breitung’s (2000) Monte Carlo simulations suggest that his test is substantially more powerful than other panel 
unit-root tests for the modest-size dataset he considered (N=20, T=30), which is similar to the sample size here. 
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the panel test (not reported) rejects the null of non-stationarity for each of the variables. From 
this we conclude that all the variables are I(1), except employment growth and budget surplus. 
For the cointegration test, we implement the error-correction panel cointegration tests 
developed by Westerlund (2007), based on structural rather than residual dynamics, which 
therefore do not impose any common factor restrictions. The idea is to test the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration by inferring whether the error-correction term in a conditional panel error-
correction model is equal to zero. The tests (Pa and Pt)25 are general enough to allow for a large 
degree of heterogeneity, both in the long-run cointegrating relationship and in the short run 
dynamics, and dependence within as well as across the cross-sectional units. These test the 
alternative hypothesis that the panel is cointegrated as a whole. 
First we test whether the variables included in the PMG regression 1.2 (the base estimation 
for subsequent regressions) are cointegrated, including GDP per capita, the fiscal variables and 
investment. Online appendix Table A3 shows that Pt rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration for all of our PMG specifications at a 5% level whereas Pa marginally fails to 
reject the hypothesis at a 10% level (p-value 0.13). In contrast, these two tests do not reject the 
hypothesis of no cointegration among the regressors. Including expenditure shares in the 
cointegration test does not change this conclusion. 
Next we perform the panel cointegration rank test for regression 2 in Table 1 following the 
approach of Larsson and Lyhagen (2000) and Larsson et al. (2001). They define the LR-bar 
statistic as the average of the i individual trace statistics, where the test statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. We find that the LR-bar test rejects the null 
that the maximum rank is zero (the test statistic of 30.25 is far above the 5% critical value of 
1.96), but cannot reject the null of a maximum rank of one.26 Our model therefore appears to 
fulfill the first set of Pesaran and Shin (1999) conditions which allows the ARDL model to 
overcome endogeneity concerns: namely, I(1) variables, a single cointegrating vector and non-
cointegrated regressors. 
Testing the ARDL lag structure 
Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) stress the importance of allowing a 
sufficiently long lag structure to deal with endogeneity problems in this ARDL context. Their 
proposed method of correcting for endogeneity – in the form of contemporaneous correlation 
among the error terms of equations (2.1) and (2.2) – is by ‘appropriate augmentation’ of the lag 
                                                          
25
 The two differ because they start from a weighted average of the individually estimated coefficients (Pa), or their 
respective t-ratios (Pt). 
26
 Similar results (supporting rank r = 1) are obtained when the cointegration rank test is applied to the regressions 
in Table 3 
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structure of the ARDL(p, q) model. Their method assumes zero cross-correlation among lagged 
errors; Cov(εi,t-i, ui,t-i) = 0, for i ≠ j. 
In particular, they show that running an ARDL(p, m) model where m = max(q, s+1), where 
s is the appropriately selected lag length of the autoregression of ∆Xi,t in (2.2), yields consistent 
estimates of the long-run parameters of interest. Hence they argue ‘in the context of the ARDL 
model inference on the long-run parameters is quite simple and requires a priori knowledge or 
estimation of the orders of the extended ARDL(p, m) model. Appropriate modification of the 
orders of the ARDL model is sufficient to simultaneously correct for the residual serial 
correlation and the problem of endogenous regressors.’ (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.386). 
These arguments for ‘augmentation’ may be thought of as applying to an initial ARDL(p, 
q) model where lags are chosen a priori as described by Pesaran and Shin above. For example, 
where an initially selected ARDL(1, 1) suffers from endogeneity, this may be corrected by 
running an ARDL(p, m) model where m ≥ 1, based on estimates of the lag structure from 
regression 2.2 in Table 2.27 
The PMG regressions discussed earlier in this section were obtained using the Pesaran and 
Shin (1999) two-step strategy in which we first chose p, the number of lags for (log) GDP per 
capita, and m the number of lags for our independent variables (fiscal policy, investment and 
employment growth). Following Pesaran and Shin (1999), these were chosen using the 
Schwarz Criterion (SC) to identify the appropriate lag structure.28 Hence, arguably our previous 
estimates should be regarded as obtained from an ARDL(p, m) model, with suitably long lag 
structures. 
However, to allow for the possibility that a longer lag structure is required to deal with 
possible endogeneity problems, we also ran equivalent regressions to those reported in Table 3 
but based on an ARDL(2, 2) model rather than the ARDL(p ≤ 2, m ≤ 2) reported there.29 
Results from the two models, for the expenditure variables of interest, are compared in Table 4. 
The key differences between the two specifications, in terms of the expenditure share 
parameter estimates, are as follows. Firstly, the two expenditures previously found to have 
significant effects on GDP − T&C and education − have smaller parameter estimates in Table 4 
but still statistically significant (at the 5% level). Secondly parameters for the other major 
spending shares of health, housing, social welfare and defence− are generally larger (in 
                                                          
27
 Standard errors for long-run PMG parameters were obtained by the delta method. 
28
 Pesaran and Shin (1999) argue from Monte Carlo experiments on the ARDL(p, m) model that the Schwarz Criterion 
is slightly superior to the Akaike Information Criterion. 
29
 Testing more than two lags is inhibited by the loss of degrees of freedom in our case. 
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absolute value) in Table 4 and are now statistically different from zero; negative in the case of 
social welfare and defence.30 
[Table 4 about here] 
Our interpretation of these results is that allowing the model to select the appropriate lag 
length is preferable. However, including additional lags by imposing two lags for all variables 
accommodates the possibility that the Schwarz Criterion eliminates some relevant lags. 
Imposing two-lags tends to strengthen, rather than weaken, the case for significant causal 
effects from a number of public expenditure categories on long-run per capita GDP levels. 
Weak exogeneity tests 
As noted earlier, Pesaran and Shin (1999) contend that the PMG overcomes endogeneity, 
assuming zero cross-correlation among lagged errors. We address this by checking whether our 
fiscal variables are ‘weakly exogenous’ or ‘long-run forcing’ for the cointegrating parameters. 
Specifically, we test whether changes in the fiscal variables are statistically unrelated to the 
error correction term from the Table 3 regressions. Each fiscal variable may still react to its 
own lagged changes, lagged changes of other variables, or lagged changes in GDP growth. 
Based on Johansen (1992) and Boswijk (1995), we can test for weak exogeneity by estimating 
marginal models for each of our fiscal variables, using a variable addition test to assess the 
statistical significance of the error correction terms obtained from Table 3 regressions for each 
of those models. If the fiscal variables are confirmed as weakly exogenous, results in Tables 1 
and 3 may be interpreted as causal effects. 
Following Calderón et al. (2015), we test the following marginal models: 
∆", = ,∆#,	 + ,∆#,	 + ,∆$,	 + ,∆$,	 + %&,' + , (4) 
where ", represents each element of the vector Xi,t; &,' = $,	 − '#,	 are the 
estimated long-run equilibrium error correction (ECM) terms, and εi,t is a random error term.31 
Hence Xi,t includes total expenditure, distortionary and non-distortionary taxes, non-residential 
private investment (all as percentages of GDP), and the shares of each expenditure component 
in total public expenditure. The null hypothesis of weak exogeneity involves testing δi = 0, as a 
t-test on the δi for each variable, or as a Wald test that the δis for all suspected endogenous 
variables are jointly zero. Rejection of the null implies rejection of weak exogeneity. 
For each of the nine estimations in Table 3, we estimate five different marginal models (for 
the four fiscal variables and investment) country by country. Like Calderón et al. (2015), we 
use the MG approach to average the coefficients on the ECM term across countries and then 
                                                          
30
 The smaller spending categories (general public, and recreation, services) appear non-robust, involving a change 
of sign. 
31
 Results reported below from regressions on (4) also include a constant term. 
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test its significance across the panel countries as a whole using the MG standard error. We also 
perform the equivalent weak exogeneity test for each country separately. 
Row 1 of Table 5 shows results for weak exogeneity tests on the three fiscal variables and 
investment entering Table 1 regression (2) – the equivalent regression to those reported in 
Table 3 but excluding any expenditure share variables. Each cell contains the estimated t-ratio 
for the unweighted average MG error correction parameters for each country. Beneath these 
values, the cell indicates the number of individual countries for which the null hypothesis of 
weak exogeneity is rejected. It can be seen that, for three of the four fiscal/investment variables 
we cannot reject weak exogeneity across the sample of countries. While the null hypothesis is 
rejected across all countries combined for one variable, ‘distortionary and other taxes’, it is 
clear that for all four variables in row 1, the null hypothesis is not rejected in all, or nearly all, 
countries. Hence one or two countries appear to drive the overall result for distortionary taxes. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Rows 2-10 show weak exogeneity test results for each expenditure share in Table 3. Of 
particular interest here is the t-ratio on each expenditure share variable (column 1). This reveals 
that, only in the case of the T&C and economic services share is the mean MG parameter in the 
marginal model statistically significantly different from zero (at 5%). More importantly 
perhaps, across the 9 expenditure shares there is typically only 1 or 2 of the 17 countries for 
which the individual country value of δi is statistically non-zero. These results offer fairly 
strong support to the view that the expenditure share variables can be considered weakly 
exogenous allowing us to interpret the estimated long-run expenditure parameters as capturing 
causal effects on GDP. 
A similar conclusion emerges from Table 5 for the other variables in the regression. That 
is, the average MG parameter (across all countries) is not significantly different from zero in 
most cases, and this is also true for the vast majority of individual country estimates. Out of a 
total of 36 parameter sets (9 spending shares x 4 variables) for 17 countries, weak exogeneity is 
never rejected in more than 4 out of 17 countries, is rejected for 3 or 4 out of 17 countries only 
8 times (out of a possible 36), with the remainder rejected in only 0−2 out of the 17 countries. 
Finally, the parameter '  in (4) which we have subjected to the weak exogeneity test is 
obtained from the previous model in which lag lengths were selected endogenously using the 
Schwarz Criterion, as described above. Given some uncertainty regarding the number of lags 
required to remove potential endogeneity, we re-ran Table 1 and Table 3 regressions on 
equation (3) imposing an ARDL (2, 2) structure. Weak exogeneity tests on these '  estimates 
are reported in the online appendix. If anything, they reveal even stronger support for weak 
exogeneity.  
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From results in the previous sub-section we are inclined to be circumspect and, based on 
Table 3, claim evidence of exogenous positive impacts on GDP from changes in transport & 
communications and education spending. However, there is some, more limited support for 
positive (negative) effects on GDP from reallocating spending towards health and housing 
(social welfare and defence). 
Short run dynamics 
As the short run dynamics in the PMG regressions are allowed to differ across countries, it 
is possible that the short run output effects of a given fiscal change differ across countries both 
in initial direction and in the speed with which the long-run effect is realised. The trajectory 
followed by each country is determined by the estimated lag structure on each fiscal variable 
for that country together with its error-correction parameter. 
Given the noise associated with estimates of the short run dynamics for each country, little 
reliance can be placed on these estimates and we do not discuss them here.32 Instead, Figure 1 
shows the average time path of GDP per capita growth rates associated with a 1 percentage 
point change in year 0 in each of the larger expenditure categories: T&C, education, health, and 
social security, based on Tables 3 regressions. We use the average of the country short run 
PMG parameters; hence obtained under the assumption of homogeneous long-run parameters 
which, for health and social welfare, are not statistically different from zero. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
As expected the figure suggests that GDP per capita growth converges on zero, as the level 
of GDP per capita converges on its new long-run value following the 1% ‘shock’. However for 
the two significantly positive spending types (T&C, education) there is considerable persistence 
with effects on growth rates still evident after 20 years. In addition, the immediate impact (in 
years 1-2) is noticeably more positive for T&C than for education – a result that seems 
plausible given the known immediate output effects of infrastructure-related investment 
compared to education spending which can be expected to take longer to affect output. For 
social security, Figure 1 suggests the possibility of negative short run growth effects – also a 
plausible result as spending is reallocated from categories likely to be less dominated by 
transfers spending. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has offered new evidence for OECD countries on the impact of the size and 
composition of public expenditure on per capita GDP. Previous regression analyses have been 
                                                          
32
 In addition, Pesaran and Shin (1999, pp.372, 384-5) warn that, even though the long-run parameters obtained 
from the PMG are consistent and converge to their asymptotic values relatively quickly, short-run parameters 
converge more slowly. They also conclude that consistent estimation of short-run parameters requires explicit 
modelling of the contemporaneous dependence among the error terms of equations (2.1) and (2.2). 
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unclear about which specific elements of the government budget are omitted from their 
analyses, or interpretation of parameter estimates is made difficult where several elements are 
explicitly or implicitly omitted. Clearly however, the method of financing any spending 
increase matters, whether this involves higher taxes (with differing distortionary 
characteristics), higher deficits, or reductions in alternative spending categories. Previous 
studies have also generally tested endogenous growth model specifications with permanent 
growth effects, and endogeneity concerns remain regarding the reliability of these estimates. 
Our examination of the impact of public expenditure on GDP for OECD countries has 
sought to deal explicitly with the financing aspects, allowed output growth effects to be 
persistent rather than permanent, and specifically addressed potential endogeneity concerns. 
Using longer time-series data than has been examined hitherto allowed us to apply more 
flexible (pooled mean group) methods that can accommodate heterogeneous short run 
responses across countries. We examined the GDP impacts of changes in total government 
expenditure, alongside changes in the shares of spending devoted to various categories. 
Both our initial PMG results, and those that explicitly account for contemporaneous 
correlation, find robust long-run positive effects on per capita GDP levels for transport & 
communication and education, with some evidence supporting positive (negative) effects for 
housing and health (social welfare) spending. Results do not support positive long-run output 
effects from switching expenditure towards defense spending (sometimes claimed to have 
growth benefits). In our estimates, this switch involves pro-rata reductions in other spending. 
Though our growth model specification precludes permanent effects on the growth rate of 
per capita GDP, we nevertheless estimate relatively persistent effects on growth rates from 
simulated T&C and education expenditure changes that last for 20 years or more. Our results 
also confirm that the assumed form of expenditure financing is crucial and we find evidence of 
negative long-run effects on output from deficit-financed increases in total public spending. 
Our interpretation is that such spending increases cannot be expected to be growth-enhancing 
unless the specific forms of that expenditure are considered carefully. 
The evidence of positive long-run effects on GDP per capita from increases in transport & 
communications, and education, spending shares appear to be robust and are consistent with 
the message from an increasing body of recent research. This points to the possibility that 
current levels of such spending in OECD countries are sub-optimal from a growth perspective, 
though clearly this may be consistent with a wider social welfare objective. 
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TABLE 1 
Testing expenditure levels & implicit financing: pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth rate 
Regression No.: 1 2 3 4 5 
Fiscal variables financed 
by: 
Non-distort. 
taxes 
Budget 
Surplus 
Distortionary 
taxes 
Distortionary& non-
distort. taxes 
Budget 
Surplus 
Long-run effects      
Budget surplus 0.022** (2.34) 
- -0.020** 
(4.64) 
-0.013** 
(3.08) 
- 
Distortionary taxes -0.060** (-4.56) 
-0.012** 
(2.84) 
- - -0.014** 
(3.11) 
Non-distortionary taxes - 0.023** (4.71) 
0.051** 
(7.78) 
- 0.029** 
(5.27) 
Total Public Expenditure 0.020** (2.17) 
-0.013** 
(5.29) 
-0.024** 
(6.12) 
-0.012** 
(3.44) 
-0.012** 
(4.94) 
Investment ratio 0.029** (2.79) 
-0.007** 
(2.41) 
0.021** 
(3.32) 
-0.004 
(1.08) 
- 
Employment growth 0.063** (4.72) 
0.020** 
(4.93) 
0.041** 
(7.03) 
0.039 
(6.37) 
0.026** 
(5.12) 
Lagged residual -0.039** (4.80) 
-0.092** 
(6.16) 
-0.062** 
(5.12) 
-0.077* 
(6.32) 
-0.092** 
(5.49) 
Short-run effects (average)      
Short-run. Total Public 
Expenditure. 1st Difference 
-0.002 
(1.83) 
-0.001 
(1.44) 
-0.001* 
(2.07) 
-0.001 
(1.57) 
-0.001** 
(2.93) 
Short-run. Total Public 
Expenditure. 2nd  Difference 
-0.000 
(1.00) 
0.000 
(1.19) 
0.000 
(1.14) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(1.18) 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below paramet rs; * (**) = significant at the 5% (1%) respectively. 
 
TABLE 2 
Testing expenditure levels: comparing regression methods 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth rate 
Regression No. 2.1 2.2 2.3  
Financed by: Budget Surplus Pooled Mean Group 
Dynamic Fixed 
Effects: 
Mean Group: Hausman Tests 
Distort. tax & other revenues -0.012** (2.84) 
-0.015 
(1.71) 
-0.018 
(0.74) 
χ
2(1) 0.08 
p-value 0.78 
Non-distortionary taxes 0.023** (4.71) 
0.024 
(1.72) 
0.094 
(1.50) 
χ
2(1) 1.30 
p-value 0.25 
Total public expenditure -0.013** (5.29) 
-0.007 
(1.28) 
-0.020 
(1.65) 
χ
2(1) 0.36 
p-value 0.55 
MG versus PMG     χ2(5): 7.20 p-value 0.21 
PMG versus DFE    χ2(5):16.51 p-value 0.00 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below parameters; * (**) = significant at the 5% (1%) respectively. 
All regressions include the three non-fiscal control variables shown in Table 1. All coefficients are 
estimated long-run effects 
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TABLE 3 
Testing public expenditure composition: pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth rate 
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Share of: T&C Educat- 
ion 
Health Hous- 
ing 
Social 
welfare 
Defence Econ. 
Serv. 
Gen. pub. 
Serv. 
Recreat- 
-ion 
Expenditure 
share 
0.022** 
(9.47) 
0.020** 
(4.92) 
0.001 
(0.80) 
0.009 
(1.56) 
-0.001 
(1.00) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
-0.005 
(1.35) 
-0.005** 
(2.86) 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
Total expenditure 0.003 (1.80) 
-0.014** 
(5.24) 
-0.006 
(1.90) 
-0.016** 
(6.09) 
-0.008 
(4.00) 
-0.004* 
(2.32) 
-0.014** 
(3.17) 
-0.011**
(5.86) 
-0.007 
(1.99) 
Short-run effects (average)         
Expenditure 
share (1STdif) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
-0.001 
(1.29) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
-0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001* 
(2.21) 
-0.001 
(0.61) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.005 
(1.23) 
Expenditure 
share (2NDdif) 
0.001 
(1.08) 
-0.001 
(1.42) 
-0.000 
(0.10) 
-0.000 
(0.17) 
-0.000 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(1.44) 
0.001 
(1.37) 
0.001 
(1.47) 
-0.001 
(1.00) 
Notes: 
(1) All regressions in the Table take the same form as regression 2 in Table 1, augmented to include each individual 
expenditure share. That is, included variables are total public expenditure; distortionary taxes, ‘other’ revenues; non-
distortionary taxes; investment ratio; employment growth, lagged GDP per capita; the Budget surplus is excluded. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses below parameters; * (**) = significant at the 5% (1%) respectively. 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Testing public expenditure composition under alternative lag structures 
Regression: 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 
Share of: T&C Education 
 
Health Hous- 
ing 
Social 
welfare 
Defence Econ. 
Serv. 
Gen. pub. 
Serv. 
Recreat- 
-ion 
ARDL (2, 2) model 
Expenditure 
share 
0.003** 
(2.58) 
0.004** 
(2.48) 
0.012** 
(3.64) 
0.037** 
(4.95) 
-0.008** 
(3.90) 
-0.007** 
(10.10) 
-0.001 
(0.37) 
0.013** 
(3.97) 
0.029* 
(2.12) 
Total 
Expenditure 
-0.012** 
(7.19) 
-0.012** 
(6.65) 
-0.015** 
(5.66) 
-0.016** 
(4.81) 
-0.004 
(1.88) 
-0.002** 
(2.77) 
-0.014** 
(6.17) 
-0.003 
(0.74) 
-0.015** 
(7.19) 
ARDL (p, q) lag structure (p, m ≤ 2) chosen by Schwarz criterion (Table 3) 
Expenditure 
share 
0.022** 
(9.47) 
0.020** 
(4.92) 
0.001 
(0.80) 
0.009 
(1.56) 
-0.001 
(1.00) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
-0.005 
(1.35) 
-0.005**
(2.86) 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
Total 
Expenditure 
0.003 
(1.80) 
-0.014** 
(5.24) 
-0.006 
(1.90) 
-0.016** 
(6.09) 
-0.008 
(4.00) 
-0.004* 
(2.32) 
-0.014** 
(3.17) 
-0.011**
(5.86) 
-0.007 
(1.99) 
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TABLE 5 
Weak exogeneity tests for fiscal and investment variables 
 Expenditure 
share 
Total 
expenditure 
Distortionary 
& other taxes 
Non-distortionary 
taxes 
Investment 
ratio 
Table 1: regression 2 - 
-0.928 
(0.99) 
0 countries 
-3.429 
(2.08)** 
2 countries 
-1.110 
(1.01) 
0 countries 
-0.868 
(0.74) 
2 countries 
Table 3 regressions:      
 
T&C 
1.747 
(2.46)** 
1 country 
0.522 
(0.21) 
2countries 
-2.911 
(1.99)** 
1 country 
0.714 
(0.55) 
1 country 
0.756 
(0.72) 
1 country 
 
Education 
 
-0.735 
(1.03) 
0 countries 
-2.382 
(2.04)** 
2 countries 
-1.790 
(1.79) 
1 country 
0.227 
(0.30) 
1 country 
-1.013 
(0.90) 
1 country 
 
Health 
-0.948 
(1.29) 
0 countries 
-3.901 
(2.71)*** 
2 countries 
-3.023 
(2.75)*** 
4 countries 
-1.002 
(1.59) 
4 countries 
1.589 
(1.56) 
2 countries 
 
Housing  
0.427 
(0.62) 
1 country 
-2.523 
(2.19)** 
0 countries 
-3.685 
(2.18)** 
1 country 
-1.675 
(1.40) 
1 country 
-0.046 
(0.06) 
0 countries 
 
Social Welfare 
-0.435 
(0.12) 
4 countries 
-3.294 
(1.61) 
0 countries 
-1.356 
(1.40) 
1 country 
0.535 
(0.95) 
1 country 
-1.753 
(0.88) 
3 countries 
 
Defence 
0.179 
(0.20) 
1 country 
-0.482 
(0.21) 
2 countries 
-3.397 
(1.47) 
1 country 
-2.328 
(1.56) 
2 countries 
0.073 
(0.05) 
0 countries 
 
Economic 
Services 
-1.973 
(2.06)** 
2 countries 
-3.489 
(3.29)*** 
2 countries 
-2.270 
(2.57)** 
4 countries 
-0.651 
(1.38) 
1 country 
1.333 
(2.06)** 
3 countries 
 
General Public 
Services 
-0.669 
(0.54) 
1 country 
-3.402 
(1.94)* 
1 country 
-2.369 
(1.52) 
1 country  
-0.175 
(0.22) 
2 countries  
3.068 
(3.50)*** 
2 countries 
 
Recreation 
-0.124 
(0.80) 
1 country 
-3.189 
(2.46)*** 
1 country 
-2.782 
(2.52)*** 
3 countries 
-0.609 
(0.83) 
4 countries  
2.003 
(1.71) 
3 countries 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below parameters. . * (**, ***) = significant at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Terms such 
as “2 countries” refers to the number of country-specific weak exogeneity tests where exogeneity is rejected at the 
5% level. 
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FIGURE 1 
Growth effect of a 1 percentage point change in the expenditure mix (in year 0) 
 
Note: Based on the results from Table 3. 
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